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ABSTRACT: In order to show how technological innovation and scientific innovation are linked in 
the course of research in human science, I present an account of a series of innovations made in our labo-
ratory (Distal Glove – Tactos system – Intertact server – Dialtact module). We will see how research on 
the technical constitution of cognitive and perceptual activities can be associated with a process of inno-
vation. The technical devices present at each stage carry an interpretative framework that prepares the 
following stages. Devices which were initially developed for the purposes of performing experiments con-
tributed both to scientific inventions and to developments with a practical and social finality.
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RESUMEN: Para mostrar cómo la innovación tecnológica y la innovación científica están vinculadas en el 
proceso de investigación en la ciencia humana, presento una aproximación de una serie de innovaciones reali-
zadas en nuestro laboratorio (Distal Glove-Tactos system-Intertact server-Dialtact module). Veremos cómo 
la investigación sobre la constitución técnica de las actividades perceptivas y cognitivas puede asociarse con un 
proceso de innovación. Los dispositivos técnicos presentes en cada estadio comportan un marco interpretativo 
que prepara los siguientes estadios. Los dispositivos que fueron inicialmente desarrollados con propósitos de 
realización de experimentos contribuyeron tanto a invenciones científicas como a desarrollos con una finalidad 
práctica y social.
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I. Introduction
When human and social sciences (economics, management, sociology, cognitive science…) 
seek to understand the processes of technological innovation, they usually remain external to 
the object of their study, in the sense that they do not themselves contribute to the concep-
tion of these innovations (Callon et al. 1986; Akrich 2002). They seek to define the actors (re-
search, marketing, social networks, the users themselves) and the conditions (social, economic, 
organizational, methodological or cognitive) that preside over the innovation. They distin-
guish between the moment of the invention and the moment of its diffusion on the market 
(which confers on it the status of an innovation), but recognize also that these moments can 
be entangled, as in the case of the user-inventor (von Hippel 1988). In any case, the prime dif-
ficulty is to explain the inventive capacity of individuals or organizations (Nonaka 1994). To 
that end, one may for example consider that an innovative organization is like an interpretative 
system that confers meaning on events coming from its environment (Daft & Weick 1984). 
But what precisely are the mechanisms by which one can explain this interpretative activity? 
What cognitive processes of interpretation are associated with an activity which creates nov-
elty? Can we do better than fall back on a mysterious individual «flash of insight»?
Moreover, within scientific research itself, there is invention by individuals and teams 
of scientists, as well as the diffusion of these inventions as “innovations” in the relevant re-
search communities. But is it just to remember that knowledge is a human historical crea-
tion that we speak about scientific “innovation” rather than “discovery” (to find a thing or 
a truth that already existed)? We want to show here the possibility of a relation between 
technological innovations and innovation in social and human science, which would not be 
a purely external relation.
The aim of this article is to show the possibility of an approach where technological in-
novation and innovation in human science are directly associated, i.e. an approach where 
the products of scientific research participate in technological conception, and at the same 
time technological innovations participate in scientific discovery.
To do this, I propose to recount a process of innovation which occurred in our own lab-
oratory (Distal Glove – Tactos system – Intertact server – Dialtact module). This story, sub-
jective and somewhat simplified, will aim in particular at showing how the scientific, tech-
nological and social dimensions of the invention were entangled. I will nevertheless attempt 
to systematically distinguish these different conditions and motives, in order to examine 
their relations. It will be necessary to be attentive to the way in which, at each stage, the con-
ditions of the scientific and technical production depend on innovations previously adopted 
in the team. We will see in particular how the technical environment, with the experimental 
devices, is carrying interpretive schemes which lead to the following innovations. I will then 
discuss the more general principles which can be inferred from these examples in order to 
better understand the processes of innovation. Before starting, however, I will give some in-
dications as to the theoretical and methodological context of this research.
II. Theoretical and methodological context
In spite of many calls for interdisciplinarity on the part of political and economic insti-
tutions, the actual relations between human science and technological developments of-
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ten amount either to indifference (if not outright opposition); or else to reciprocal instru-
mentalisation (Mitcham 1994; Cresswell 2011). In the first case, technologies (considered 
as mere means) are opposed to society and culture, the latter being considered as the sole 
source of meaning. In the second case the “humanities” are called upon merely to promote 
the social acceptance of technical devices developed elsewhere and independently (or, at 
best, to propose minor adjustments by taking the user into account); conversely, it is the 
human sciences which instrumentalize technologies by taking them as a field of study —for 
example, the study of processes of innovation.
In order to overcome these oppositions, our research team aims to carry out funda-
mental research on the phenomenon of human technology in all its various dimensions 
—anthropological, historical, sociological, economic and cognitive.1 This is what we call 
“technological research in human science”. The fundamental hypothesis is that “Technol-
ogy is Anthropologically Constitutive” (Stiegler 1998); i.e. that a human being belong-
ing to a historical culture which is both symbolic and material is necessarily a technical be-
ing, whose activities and lived experience depend on a technical milieu which is inherited, 
constructed, modified and transmitted. One of our goals is thus to understand the way in 
which tools and technical systems make possible or transform our lived experience and our 
individual or collective activities.
For the domain of cognitive science which will concern us here, it is a question of un-
derstanding how technical mediations participate in our cognitive activities, in particular 
for perception and for social interactions (but also for scientific research and technological 
innovation which are themselves cognitive activities). Rather than being a matter of ma-
nipulating internal mental representations, we consider that cognitive activity unfolds in 
an environment which is technically equipped and which extends in the space of external 
inscriptions. This field of research is currently being developed under the title «extended 
mind theory» (Clark & Chalmers 1998), and is inscribed in the general paradigm of em-
bodied and embedded cognition (Chemero 2009).
III. The history of a process of technico-scientific innovation
1. Sensory substitution systems
We can begin the story we want to tell here with the visit of Paul Bach-y-Rita to our labo-
ratory in 1995. By presenting us his sensory substitution device, the TVSS (Tactile Vision 
Substitution System), he brought both a highly original technical device and an opportu-
nity for fundamental research on perception and its technical mediation.
At the technical level, the TVSS was designed for blind persons. The simple idea is that 
of replacing a deficient sensory modality with another one that is still available. Created in 
the late 1960’s by Paul Bach-y-Rita, this device converts visual information captured by a 
video-camera into tactile signals in the form of a 20 × 20 matrix of points. In this way the 
image, reduced to 400 pixels (black or white without any intermediate levels of grey) is pro-
1 Equipe EA2223 COSTECH (Knowledge, Organisation and Technical Systems) and Master User 
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jected onto the skin by means of electromagnetic (or piezo-electric) point vibrators, or di-
rectly by electrical stimuli (Figure 1).
Camera




For Bach-y-Rita, the origin of his idea lay at the crossroads between social preoccupations 
(restoring a form of vision for blind persons) and scientific interests (demonstrating the 
importance of brain plasticity). For us, observations on the usage of this technological in-
novation promised some crucial empirical elements for the debates in cognitive science in 
which we were engaged. Following the increasing criticism of computo-representational-
ism (Winograd & Flores 1986), we wished to contribute to the development of an alter-
native, ecological and enactive approach to cognition according to which perception was 
an embodied activity and not simply the reception of information (Gibson 1986; Varela et 
al. 1991).
The observations on the usage and learning of the TVSS are particularly interesting 
for understanding spatial perception and the processes of appropriation of a new tool. If 
learning occurs while the camera is placed on a table and remains immobile, the percep-
tual capacities remain very limited and amount merely to patterns of tactile stimulation 
that are felt on the skin. However, if the blind person is allowed to take hold of the cam-
era and to actively explore simple scenes, then a significant change occurs: progressively 
(after something like fifteen hours of learning), the subject becomes able to recognize 
highly complex forms, and even faces. Above all, and quite dramatically, this increased 
capacity to recognize shapes seems to be accompanied by an externalization of the per-
cepts (Bach-y-Rita 2004). It is as if the sensation of a succession of rapidly changing tac-
tile stimuli on the skin produced by the continual rotation and movement of the camera, 
drops out of consciousness; and are replaced by the perception of stable objects that are 
situated at a distance, “out there” in front of the subject. These striking results deserve 
new systematic experimental studies (Epstein 1986; Auvray et al. 2005) because they 
raise a whole host of important questions, which are at once scientific, technological and 
philosophical.
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How can perceptual learning explain the passage from the perception of stimuli on the 
skin, to the perception of an object “out there” in space? How can one explain the appro-
priation by which the technical device, which was initially perceived as an object (camera, 
tactile stimulator), “disappears” and becomes transparent with respect to the objects that 
it makes it possible to perceive? How can we explain this spectacular brain plasticity? The 
tactile sensory input has nothing in common with that of the retinal system, and neither 
does the manual control of the camera have anything in common with the control of the 
ocular muscles. Nevertheless the brain turns out to be able to re-organize itself to produce 
a perceptual world specifically characterized by the recognition and indeed the localization 
of shapes and objects. This involves understanding the functional relationships between 
the technically equipped organism and its environment, i.e. a structure of sensori-motor 
coupling that is sufficiently stable to induce this functional reorganization of the central 
nervous system (Obayashi et al. 2001).
There are here some empirical elements in favour of a conception of the space of “ob-
jective exteriority” as constituted through an activity of coupling between the organism 
and its environment, a coupling which depends on the possibilities for action and sensing 
which are available to the technically equipped organism. This framework also makes it 
possible to explore experimentally the notion of “the technical constitution of human ex-
perience”, by allowing for a study of the way a technical mediation opens up a new world 
of action, perception and meaning. Sensory substitution systems only carry to their ex-
treme limit, thereby rendering them clearer, the general principles of the functioning of 
cognition when tools transform and augment our human experience (O’Regan & Noë 
2001). The nature of the lived experience obtained by using this device has been the ob-
ject of numerous discussions. Is it a form of “vision”; or is it still a “tactile” experience even 
if it gives access to objects at a distance? It seems to us that the best reply is simply to ad-
mit the novelty and the specificity of the lived experience corresponding to each type of 
device when taken “in hand”. This is why, instead of talking about “sensory substitution” 
devices, we have proposed to define these techniques which transform our lived experi-
ence as “perceptual supplementation” devices (Lenay et al. 2002; Auvray & Myin 2009). 
Indeed, one of the interesting features of this experimental situation is that it makes it 
possible to “replay” in the adult the learning of a new perceptual modality. This permits 
the opening of a dialogue with the phenomenological description of lived experience, 
since the philosopher can place himself in the conditions of the experiment (Lenay & 
Steiner 2010).
At the technical level, following a classical tendency towards discreet miniaturization, 
a new version of the TVSS has been developed to distribute the sensory data in the form of 
electrical stimuli on the tongue (TDU, Tongue Display Unit) (Bach-y-Rita 2004). For us, 
starting from a scientific perspective, our first idea was to create a minimalist device.
2. Distal glove. A minimalist system of distal perception
In order to identify the necessary conditions for the appearance of a space in which stable 
objects are perceived, one approach consists of deliberately simplifying the device as much 
as possible, and testing whether the phenomena still occur. This “minimalist” method 
consists therefore of reducing as far as possible the repertoires of action and sensation 
that are available for the subject. In this spirit, the “Distal glove” consists of reducing the 
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400 points of the TVSS to a single point, a single photo-electric cell connected to a single 
tactile stimulator (Lenay 1997; Marque et al. 2000). When the luminous intensity of the 
incident light-field passes a certain threshold, this triggers an all-or-nothing tactile stimu-
lus (Figure 2).
Figure 2
A minimalist sensory substitution system
At each point in time the blind (or blindfolded) subject receives only a minimal amount 
of information, one bit corresponding to the presence or absence of the tactile stimulus. It 
has been possible to show that even in these drastically reduced conditions, the subject is 
still able to localize a target placed in different directions and at various distances (Lenay 
1997; Siegle et Warren 2010). It is quite easy to understand that the subject should in prin-
ciple be able to solve the task by means of triangulation, by aiming at the target with dif-
ferent positions of the arm and angles of the wrist. The spatial perception corresponds to 
a synthesis of a temporal succession of sensations and actions. Each position of the target 
corresponds to a specific, unique sensori-motor invariant, i.e. a law relating actions to sensa-
tions. This is a good illustration of what O’Regan and Noë call a “law of sensori-motor con-
tingency”, which fits in the framework of an enactive approach to perception (O’Regan & 
Noë 2001). The device provides an artificial coupling between an organism and the envi-
ronment to which it gives access. The new relation which it instigates between the actions 
and the sensory feedback provided to the subject gives rise to the constitution of specific 
percepts (Lenay et al. 2002).
The distal glove, as an initial technological innovation, opened up the possibility of an 
experimental methodology for fundamental scientific research on the constitution of ex-
perience in the case of tools grasped in the hand. The technical mediation made it possible 
to control and to vary the repertoires of action and sensation, in order to study the types of 
sensori-motor invariants arising from each type of mediation.
This initial technical device could inspire all sorts of new developments (Auvray & 
Myin 2009), for example increasing the number of captors (at the end of each finger in or-
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der to actively explore the distal space, or in a circle around a hat to give access to omni-di-
rectional perception) (Kerdegari et al. 2015), or by replacing the photo-electric captors by 
movement detectors so as to reproduce the experiments in the digital environment of vir-
tual reality. But the main direction we have taken, primarily for scientific reasons, consists 
of systematically exploring active perception in the case of shape recognition.
3. Tactos system. Shape recognition
At the technical level, the aim was to simplify still further the possibilities for action, in 
order to study the perception of shapes in a two-dimensional space. The “Tactos” sys-
tem makes it possible to « touch » digital shapes present on the screen of a computer 
(Hanne ton et al. 1999). The user controls the movements of a receptor field in the 
digital space of the computer screen (with the computer mouse, a graphic tablet or di-
rectly with the finger on a tactile screen) (Figure 3). When the receptor field crosses the 
colored pixels of a shape, a tactile stimulation is triggered. This stimulation is produced 
by the activation of an electronic Braille cells that the user touches with the index finger 
of their free hand.
On the scientific level, it has been shown that the users (blind persons or blindfolded 
adults) can learn to localize and recognize simple shapes (Ziat et al. 2007). Here again, 
the perception is necessarily active because there is no intrinsic spatiality in the sensory 
input. This perception is thus realized essentially through a perceptual trajectory that 
can easily be recorded, analyzed, and modeled (Stewart & Gapenne 2004). By its highly 
restrictive conditions, our device forces a spatial and temporal deployment of the percep-
tual activity.
Figure 3
The Tactos system. Here a matrix of 9 receptor fields is coupled with a matrix of 9 tactile stimulators. 
When a receptor field covers a coloured pixel, the corresponding tactile stimulator is activated. 
Figure 3 B. Recordings of perceptual trajectories. When the receptor field crosses a black pixel 
the subject receives a tactile stimulus (red points).
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With this experimental setup, we were able to explore the way in which the perceptual ac-
tivity is transformed when the technical mediation is progressively complexified, for exam-
ple by studying the effects of progressively increasing the number of receptor fields (with a 
corresponding increase in the number of tactile stimulators). This allowed for an economy 
of movement and memory, and thus for perceptions which were more rapid and more pre-
cise (Sribunruangrit et al. 2003).
At the social level, the Tactos system could be directly useful. Thus, although screen-
reader technologies are now providing access to many digital activities for the blind and 
visually impaired persons, these solutions have the drawback of poorly conveying spatial 
information such as data charts and tables, drawings, graphical interfaces and web pages 
layouts. With the Tactos System, the users can perceive the shapes and the layout of objects 
on the screen. With the user engagement in learning, more complex content like maps or 
webpages layout become meaningful (Gapenne et al. 2003). The evaluation of these devices 
was conducted by the longitudinal tracking of several young users. The interest of the Tac-
tos system as an aid for teaching geometry to young blind students from a special education 
school has also been demonstrated (Rovira & Gapenne 2009).
Several of the first generation of blind users have become our collaborators, contrib-
uting to a new cycle of technological innovation according to the uses they imagined: 
bi-modality (acoustic information distributed according to the position of the receptor 
field) (Ammar et al. 2002), tactile zoom (by active variation of the size of the receptor 
fields), spatial games (crosswords, sudoku, memory) (Tixier et al. 2013). Moreover, the 
Tactos device naturally lent itself to a major new innovation: the formation of social net-
works.
4. Intertact server. Perceptual crossing
Once we had created a way of “touching” digital shapes on the screen, it became appar-
ent that this digital space could be shared between several users. For this we have devel-
oped the “Intertact” server that distributes interactive and multiuser applications to Tac-
tos users. The receptor fields of each participant are associated with a “body-image”, i.e. 
a shape that can be perceived by other users. When the receptor fields of one participant 
touch the body-image of a partner, the receptor fields of this second participant touch 
the body-image of the first (Figure 4). This is the situation of “perceptual crossing”, just 
as when looks meet each other or when there is inter-individual contact by touch. One 
can thus construct all sorts of spaces for games and exploration, in which the users can en-
counter each other, follow each other and jointly perceive objects belonging to a common 
environment.
On the scientific level, the technical device enabled us to construct a minimalist form 
of perceptual crossing in a shared one-dimensional space of action (left-right movements of 
a receptor field) and an all-or-nothing tactile stimulus when the receptor field encounters 
an object, be it the body-image of the partner, or fixed or mobile lures.
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Figure 4
Study protocol for a minimalist perceptual crossing
Without entering here into details, the analysis of the way in which participants succeed 
in the task of recognizing the other subject (clicking on the body-image of the partner) 
turned out to be surprising. We were lead to conclude that the recognition of another 
subject had to be collective before it could become individual: the perceptual activities of 
the two subjects had to “capture” each other, and it was only afterwards that the individ-
ual subjects could recognize each other. The feeling of the “presence” of another subject 
is due to this sort of mutual engagement. Thus a technical innovation led to a theoretical 
innovation for understanding the phenomena of social cognition. The same experimental 
paradigm has subsequently allowed us to propose new approaches to phenomena such as 
the mimicry of facial expressions or joint attention (Lenay & Stewart 2012; Deschamps 
2016).
These scientific questions connect directly with the important issue of the social suc-
cess of an innovation. Thus, in spite of the effectiveness of sensory substitution devices 
such as the TVSS, which is widely recognized, it is surprising—and disappointing—to note 
that they have been pretty much a failure, both socially and economically. Why is it that 
these techniques, which were invented in the 1960’s and experimentally validated in the 
1970’s, have had so little impact on the daily life of blind and visually handicapped per-
sons? There are many possible answers to this question: a practical effectiveness which is 
insufficient (none of these devices enables a blind person to drive a car); the unpleasant 
feeling of looking like a weird cyborg; but perhaps, above all, the lack of a quality of lived 
experience. One can try showing a person who has been blind from birth the image of his 
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wife, or his own image in a mirror; one can try showing blind students sexy pin-ups; in all 
cases, the disappointment is flagrant. There is indeed the constitution of an object, the cog-
nitive capacity for discrimination and categorization; but there is no emotional value at-
tached to these objects (Bach-y-Rita 2002).
In the process of innovation described here, the work was carried out on the basis of 
problems that were initially of interest from the scientific point of view before taking into 
account social uses. And what is remarkable here is that the partial failure of the adoption 
of these innovations by blind people becomes a new and important scientific problem. The 
technological situation offers the opportunity of conducting empirical research concern-
ing the anthropological question of the genesis of the values (emotional, ethical, aesthetic) 
that are attached to percepts. Our approach consists of working on the collective construc-
tion of values. The hypothesis is that genuine perceptual values are intimately linked to 
the insertion of the person concerned in a community of shared meanings, a collective his-
tory in a common environment defined by the same means of access. It is thus in order to 
try and respond to this social issue that we are working to set up a fundamental study of 
prosthetic perceptual interactions between people, and that we are studying the conditions 
for the recognition of another subject or the engagement in mimetic processes (Lenay et 
 Stewart 2012). Giving the users the perception of a shared world is indeed more likely to 
carry meaning and to promote emotional investment.
Indeed, at the sociological and economic levels, a tactile Internet ought to make it pos-
sible to observe the formation of communities of users. The Intertact server thus offers a 
space made up of multiple virtual rooms that the users can explore together, “rooms” de-
voted either to a programme for learning simple shapes, or to educational contents (geom-
etry, geography) (Sribunruangrit et al. 2004), or to practical information about the regions 
(bus-routes, google-map), or yet again to various games (memory, Sudoku, battleships, 
mazes…). We have thus built an open system which should enable future users to contrib-
ute to the creation of new “rooms” with original contents. It is also in order to enlarge these 
communities, and to respond to an obvious demand on the part of users, that we are now 
developing a portable version of devices for tactile interaction.
5. Dialtact – A module for tactile interaction
On the technical level, making a portable version of our devices required above all that 
we sufficiently miniaturize the system of tactile stimulation (a 4 × 4 matrix of piezoelec-
tric stimulators) to achieve an energetically autonomous module that could be mounted 
on the back of a Smartphone. One of the prime advantages of this device is that it can be 
used with just one hand: the thumb on the screen controls the movements of the receptor 
fields, whereas the index finger is placed on the matrix of tactile stimulators on the back of 
the Smartphone. It also allows for the exploration and perception of the graphic interface 
on the screen. But above all, the software Dialtact allows for rich inter-individual tactile in-
teractions, each subject directly controlling the activation of the tactile stimulators of their 
partner (Figure 5).
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Figure 5
Initial prototype of the Module for Tactile Interaction
At the scientific level, the observations made with the Intertact server have shown that a 
very simple design of interaction allows for the creation of a dynamics of perceptual cross-
ing which conveys the feeling of the “presence” of another subject. Now, the Dialtact de-
vice makes it possible to envisage the study of the development of a form of tactile language 
which could be differentiated between different communities of users. We are currently 
making some initial observations on groups of alpha-test highschool children.
At the social level, the aim of this device (and the financing which helps us to develop 
it) is to propose applications which may interest the general population, and not merely 
communities of blind users. Indeed, it is a question of exploring a new market, that of tac-
tile interfaces for access to information in a discreet manner (without having to bend one’s 
head to look at a screen, and without having to wear head-phones) for guidance and inti-
mate communication.
IV. Discussion
In order to understand the process of innovation presented here, we may take up the ap-
proach proposed by Daft and Weick (1984) concerning innovation by organizations. 
Thus, our team of research in human science functions at each moment of the process like 
an “interpretative system” with regard to its scientific and social environment. At the scien-
tific level, this environment is that of debates within communities of scientists concerning 
perception, social cognition and the study of technologies; at the social level, it is a question 
of associations of blind persons with their practices of digital technologies. The “interpre-
tation” consists of giving meaning to events coming from these environments, in order to 
transform their knowledge and to decide what can be done. This interpretative activity of 
the organization can be seen through the actions collectively taken. Daft and Weick distin-
guish various types of interpretative practice: either by considering the environment as al-
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ready given, in which case it is merely a case of knowing it better in order to improve the 
technical devices; or by considering that the environment is itself defined by interpretative 
practices. In this latter case the interpretative activity consists of transforming the environ-
ment by introducing new technologies and practices, and then observing their success or 
failure. Rather than responding to demands which are supposed to pre-exist, it is a question 
of inventing new uses and testing the possibility of new markets. In the latter case, the au-
thors speak of “organisation enacting”. As noted by Brown and Duguid (1991), it is not a 
question of responding to empirical observations, but rather of constructing a conceptual 
framework and imposing it on the environment.
We may add that this interpretative framework is not only conceptual, but that it is in-
scribed in technically equipped practices. It is the technical devices that are currently pres-
ent and used which are bearers of an interpretative framework, since they transform our 
perception of what is possible. Invention is not simply a choice in a situation of limited 
rationality (Newell et al. 1959); it is rather that the field of possible choices, of solutions 
that can actually be achieved at a given moment, is itself constituted by the technical de-
vices that one has available. Thus, creative imagination is supported by technical devices. 
Amongst the four stages of the “inventive process” identified by Usher (1929) (1-« recog-
nition of a new or incompletely gratified want » ; 2-« setting the stage » ; 3-« act of in-
sight » ; 4-« critical revision ») it seems to us that the second is the most important. Once 
the technical elements (together with the know-how concerning their usage) are assem-
bled, the “invention” appears as a solution that is present in a field of accessible possibilities, 
without any need of a mysterious “insight”.
The technical constitutivity of human activities necessarily implies a form of “advance” 
of the technical conditions with respect to what they will reveal when they are actually de-
ployed. At each stage, we well understand how the Distal glove gives rise to the possibility of 
Tactos for the perception of bi-dimensional shapes; how Tactos gives rise to the possibility 
of Intertact for interactions on the Net; and how Intertact gives rise to the possibility of Di-
altact for mobile tactile communication. It is equally evident that when we first developed 
the initial minimalist devices towards the end of the 1990’s, we didn’t have the least idea of 
these perspectives that were subsequently discovered. Insofar as the technology is constitu-
tive, conditions and problems that govern the development of an innovation are always dif-
ferent from the issues and conditions for success that arise through its use. Knowledge of the 
market, of the users, and their needs always comes after the event, since at each stage of the 
development of an innovative technological device, the device itself opens up unsuspected 
possibilities and problems which did not even exist at the moment of its inception.
We have seen that these experimental devices were an important source of innovation, 
whose consequences were not only scientific but also practical and social. And when it is a 
question of proposing practical uses for these devices, a second cycle of development is put 
in place, this time in close relation with potential users who can also themselves contribute 
to the conception of new functionalities.
V. Conclusion
We have seen in the cases presented here that the innovations correspond first and fore-
most to devices created for the purpose of fundamental research. It is only afterwards that 
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the practical deployment of these devices in their experimental context rendered visible 
some possible new innovations with social value. There is a link between fundamental re-
search and technological development, but it is not a relation of “application”. For exam-
ple, it is not knowledge supposedly acquired concerning “natural” cognition which guided 
the conception of cognitive technologies such as writing, nor is it knowledge already ac-
quired on perception that would have led to the invention of perceptual supplementa-
tion systems. Technological innovation does not result from a process of explicit reason-
ing through the application of knowledge which already exists, because on the contrary it 
is the technical device which participates in the constitution of the knowledge in question. 
The theory of the technical constitutivity of cognitive activities is prolonged by a technical 
constitution of this theory itself. This is a basic characteristic of an experimental method 
which, beyond the simple verification (or refutation) of prior hypotheses (the hypothet-
ico-deductive method), expects from the situation created by actually putting the exper-
imental device into practice, that it should reveal phenomena which otherwise could not 
even have been imagined. However, whereas technological innovations do ceaselessly open 
up unexpected possibilities, they also allow us to better understand what is happening. Un-
derstanding how variations in technical devices modify cognitive or perceptual activities, 
amounts to better understanding these activities themselves (spatial localization, shape rec-
ognition, recognition of another subject, joint attention…). Our research aims to under-
stand the technologies to better understand the human, i.e. an unfinished being, always en-
gaged in a historical and technological becoming. This is what solves here the paradox of 
innovation that can simultaneously be scientific discovery.
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